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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
U. S. $1.00 = Hwan 1,300
Hwan. 1, 000 = U. S. $0. 769
Hwan 1, 000, 000, 000 = U.S. $769, 230
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BASIC DATA
Area 383,020 sq. miles
of wJhich cultivated 7,790 sq. miles
Population (1960 census) 24.7 mil lion
Population Grc,wth (1955_1960 estimates) 2.5 - 2.8% p.a.
Gross National Product (1960, Hwan billion) 2,139.0
Annual Rate of Growith since 1958 (at constant 3.8%
prices)
Per Capita Income (1960) /US $75-80
1/
Total Available Resources (1960 Ewan billion) 2,370.8
Contribution of Net Capital Inflow 9.8%
Gross Capital Formation (in %) 14.6%
Government Budget (1Ewan billion) 1958 1960
Total Revenue 19365 TL7
Current Expenditures 27o83 326¢9
Of which Defense (124.,2) (143,2)
Current Account Deficit (-) -54.2 e
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Exports &2 Sales to U.N. Forces 7409 95.5
Imports 377.6 3h2,6
Of which U.S. Aid imports (311.0) (246,3)
Other cuerrent transactions (net) 17.7 4h4
Current Account Balance .285.0 -242 0 7
Public Grants and Loans 316.3 243.1
Other capital movements -
Net Increase (-) in Foreign -31.8 - 1.5
Assets
Errors and Omissions .-5 - 2.1
lioney Supply (1960, 1957 = 100) 151
Cost of Living (1960, 1957 = 100) 109
1/ P-ljs+ti evr^knge rate estim a tea, d at- Tah 1, - = TT, -I 1,1,OO
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OU1hAlRY A10 CONCLUSIONS
i. Koreals political situation has undergone profouncd changes in the
past 20 months. In April, 1960, Syngman Rhee, after having ruled the country
for 12 years, was forced to resign. In July, the Democratic Party, under
John M. Chang, won the elections, but tensions within the party weakened
his government. In Mtay, 1961, a military junta staged a successful coup
dtetat and replaced the Legislative Assermbly by the military Supreme Council
of National Reconstruction. Under Chairman Lt. Gen. Chung Hee Park, the
SCIR immediately embarked on an extensive program to eliminate corruption
and other social evils and develop t;-le country's economy. Chairman Park
has repeatedly promised to hold elections and turn over the government to
civilian authorities in 1963.
2. The country's economic -plight today is largely a result of the
division of the Korean peninsula in 19)5 and the Korean war, 1950-53.
As a result of the partition, most of t. e industries and a 'Large part of
the mineral deposits were lost to North Korea. The war inf'Licted heavy
human and material losses on the South and forced it to maintain a stand-
ing army of 600,000 men. Large scale foreign aid was, therefore, essential
for the country's survival. This assistance was extended by the United
States and enabled Korea to maintain its bi2 defense establishment and to
complete the reconstruction task by li57.
3. During the reconstruction period, GNP in real terms rose at an
annual average rate of h.6,X. Gross dorestic savings amounted to merely
3% of GSTP, but with thse help of U.S. aid, investrment was equivalent to 12%
onf flI1P. The natural population increase in excess of' 2.5S limited gains
in per capita incomes to 2% per annum, so that the standard of living which
had been severely depressed br destruction and a substantial nmber of
refugees from the North, surpassed pre-Korean war levels only in 1957. The
reconstruction years -wsere chnaractekrized by, ro,-pant nflin, t +Iih the monnyr
supply expanding at annual rates of 50%.
4. After 1957, a monetary stabilization program eliminated inflation.
Uove-rmuient ueficits were drastically reuceud and total savlngs rose -to oIc
of GMP. Exp-iorts, including sales to U.N. forces, covered alnost one-fourth
of imports, compared to onrly about one-sixth during tlhe reconstruction
period. Foreign aid declined from its peak of $383 million in 1957 to P$235
million in 1Q59/60. Howe-vr, the increase ln domestilc savlngs mi.ore than
compensated ior the decline in foreign aid and permitted an increase in
investmrnent to over l5% of GNP.
5.)t 1ionetary improvement was, however, accompanied by declining rate!s
of income growth. After reaching a peak of 8.7% in 1957, the rate dropped to
2.47% in 1960 and probably to 1% in 1961; per capita income fell slightly to
about 575-80, while the already serious unemployment situation was aggravated.
Political un::ertainties undoubtedly exerted a depressing influence. Moreover,
the transition from inflation to monetary stability, coupled with the intro-
duction of a realistic exchange rate, slowed down growth. But the recession
- it -
was also due to misdirected invPsb.i;ent .nd ri slnknning domanr fc)r mnqnifqrtured
consumer goods, caused largely by falling agricultural prices and incomes
afte.r 1958. rn MNay 1961, the military grovrnment launched a progrnmr of re-
flation in order to stimulate economic activity. The 25, increase in the
money% supply,% w?hich oclrdlnil?4 Septe_r.ber, did not rasn piesrotcaby
If the expansion continues and the velocity of circulation recovers from it;s
present abononxma Lly low level +-a, hr is +he,- A--JJ of renewed .lU A-I J14d-
pressure, although unused capacities, a record rice crop, and accumulated
fLorei-;gn exchange rese -Ves give 4the supl of -od - cosdeal dere - of--J. *J. ~ ~ LL~i~~ L ~ ~ 6.L V U1I~ D JFJJLy 01. ~'L L~ 0vJLI LU ±d.LJL , Lr, VJ.L
elasticity.
6. The military government's five-year development plan for 1962-66
postulates Investment anu growth targets which0 oy lar exceeu tne potentlal
of the economy. This view is also gaining ground within the Government.
Discussions are under way on a reduction of tne program to more manageable
proportions by concentrating on high priority investments in power, agricul-
ture, railways, coal mining and selected fields of manufacturing, If the
economy's development potential over tile next five years is fully utilized,
GNP should grow about 5% p.a. (whereas the present plan proposes 7.170); at
this rate of growth, the standard of living could be raised moderately and
foreign assistance reduced towards the end of the plan period.
7. These are not spectacular prospects and, indeed, Korea will still
have to go a long way to achieve economic viability. Nevertheless, assuming
continued U.S. assistance at approximately the present level, prospects for
the successful implementation of a modified investment program appear good.
This should be facilitated by the impending normalization of relations with
Japan (Korea's biggest export market).
8. A modified development proaram within the economy's potential wil:L
probably require foreign financing over and above the present level of U.S.
aid and Korea's own export earnings in the initial years of the five-year
period, Contributions are likely to be made by Japan and Germany, but will
nrobablv not cover the amount of additional financing needed,
I. RECEN1T POLITICAL EVENTS
1. The Republic of Korea wyas establishied in 1948. Dr. Syngman Rhee
was chosen as the first President and was reelected after the Korean war,
1950-1953. During the 1950's, however, Rhee's regime and hiis Liberal Party
became increasingly corrupt and dictatorial. Political tension built up
and exploded in April 1960, in the wake of students' demonstrations againSt
the rigged election of Phee and his nartvy Rhee eventually left the country,
and a caretaker government was formed.
2. In July 1960, new elections were held and the Democratic Party,
,ind'r .Tohn M. Mihnna won 1h-r a comn,fortnfb+.lheP rgin in both the House of
Representatives and the House of Councillors. The division of the party
between Chang ls Unew factinn" and the "ol min hollTeveTr threatened the
Democratic parliamentary majority from the very beginning. This handicap
was to prove fatal to the new Government, headed by CIhnan ngca Prime Hinrist4,er
His attempts to force party unity failed and he managed to press legislation
through with very sli- r;ajontites or.ly. many of the+countrj's
pressing politica-L, economic and social problems were not tackled effectively.
3. Changls Government lasted barely ten months. On :Iay 16, 1961, a
m; J U i rs _-r m s A _ ~-A- 4 A4- 1 _ 1- - U- - _4J)_, _P - - h - A Q----IL- a m ",o stlILL X DCay JU.llua s_Jls;)A> J. Z:UV11lLL11C11L,_Ly VUt ykuwli -r V.l: D _CWLLUl-1 it_ ; c:_LJ;W
bloodless and successful coup dtetat. The old regime was ousted, and many
oUp ilt r,LUe W-- andA IIFwizer- Lrere arr-es'e-, the par'iamentaiy system
abolished and the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) was esta-
seished. Under± tIh 0Lil,L1 lsi±p of Lt. General Ch-.Ig Hee ]'ark, a Lealde of
the revolution, the SCNR replaced the Legislative Assembly and assumed full
Ioliticl - conr WoUl 01 lt The officeU of Llh r1esiderltL of Uthe Republi c as V,e aPo±±cauL 0UI2U.±I ±±C0.L1 ra~i~0.~U10L4 ULL tIVCL± d
the cabinet system remained but most of the top ofLicials wJere reolaced either
by members ofL. the military group or by !reliable" civilians.
4. ITi:nediately after the co-up, the revolutbionary reg,imile made public:
its policy program: a) the basic policy Coals are anti-corr'munism and
strengthlen-inLg ofl the nationts ties with the iree Uorld; b) corruption and
other social evils, widely practiced before the revolution, must be wiped
out; c) a sound program to exploit the country;s economic resources is to be
planned and efficiently executed; d) the military junta is ready to turn
over the Government to civilians "as soon as the revolutionary pledges are
fulfilled" . Ghair3nan Park since then has repeatedly promised newr elections
and a civilian Go-vernment by miid-1963.
5. To implement its program, the new Government iim,iedately took a
variety of measures ranging fro= strict enforcement of traffic laws to harsh
punishment of corrupt officials, private profiteers, and communist syTmpa-
thizers. Some of these measures assuumed extreme proportions and, consequently,
created resentment among the population, particularly in private business
circles. Nevertheless, most observers agree that the junta has consolidated
its position.
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II, THE ECONOUIiC SETTING
6. The long Japanese rule over Korea, from 1910 to 1945, had consicter-
able impact on the economy of the Korean peninsula. The economy was pri-
marily so developed as to complement Japanese production, and by 1939, exports
to yen-bloc countries accounted for 97, of total exports. The Japanese built
a railway system which connected Korea with iianchuria in the north and prc-
vided an important link to Japan in the south. Highways were constructed,
the postal system and telecommunications developed, and power plants built.
The old monetary system was supplanted by a currency system integrated with
that of Japan, and a modern financial and banking structure established.
Heavy and light manufacturing industry was increasingly developed, and it is
estimated that in 1938, industry and mining accounted for some 40% of CLNP.
Basically, hcwever, the Korean economy remained predominantly agricultural,
and large quantities of rice were exported to Japan, with imports of other
grains, mostly from Manchuria, making up the domestic deficiency of food-
stuffs created by rice exports. Most of the progress towards industrializa-
tion under the Japanese bypassed the Koreans because industry had largely
developed as a Japanese establishment. Few Koreans had attained positions
of responsibility and wealth, and no substantial effort had been made to
prepare them for technical and managerial positions. And, in general, the
industrial pattern which had evolved was so closely linked to the needs of
the Japanese economy that a major adjustment was necessary to the requirements
of an independent Korean economy.
7. Political events after liberation, however, made progress towards
the development of an independent and integrated economy of Korea as a whole
impossible. Tiberation coincided with partitic of the countr along the
38th parallel which under Allied agreements was originally meant to be only
a der,^areaticn line between Russian and American oecupation zones, but soon
became a boundary. The last economic tie between the two parts was cut inMay 1O)W ~~rn 4-i~ ?Trv,-4-- -:.4-,. ..- 1... - 1~ __ -.:- ~ -~_
-Mnv Y R th^. e Nlort+h trminau 
_L ±1 .^ ..yLy V.L p_±U :L,_  -) UlA_ B
South, and the rough economic unity which had existed was destroyed.
8. The American zone which later became the Republic of Korea, com-
prise -l,0-0 L-Lqna mlle wt a novwlabion in Hiay i944 OI about
16 million, wThereas the Russian zone was 48,000 square miles with about9 million Knreans. A lIrge infl o P of r g from __ t.T_hI increasedthe
~~~~~~~S-w-L -L6 'z-Ls 9VA u8t,t;: 1AT-UJIL Ul1U 1VAFBAull 11L'a3ea UnE!
population pressure in the South by raising the density to some 550 per
square m^le in 1947 . Both zones had roughly the same cultivated acreage, but
the irrigated rice lands were about three times as large in the Southern
zone as in the Norther-Ln. Huoever, other resources were distributed between
North and South in such a way as to make one complementary to the other.(PI,I - WT4.1 ----- ~~-i- the_ part . .the ineal j/ ofThe North possessed the greater part of the nationis mineral wealth (79% of
the coal, 56% of the graphite, 57% of the lead, 71% of the nickel, 75% of the
zinc, ald 97U % of the iron ore production in 1944) and heavy industry (90%
of the metallurgical and more than 80% of the machine industry). The light
cons-urier goods (e.g. 85% of textile plants) and processing industries were
located in the South which also accounted for a greater part of agricultural
out put. Partition meant that North Korean products of heavy industry could1
not be converted into consumer goods because the manufacturing capacities of
the South were inaccessible. Many manufacturing plants in the South were
cut off from the source of their raw materials; and agriculture needed
chemical fertilizers, the railways coal from the North, In agricultural
r- -u cs,4 t1e horh depende 1 riceDr +om h nti+.h_ a1t1hough
.Pr 9W%Ai;> IJ1t. U l Ul , j 'Lui Ut:,llUL1U:: Uli 1 -o'% L.L VIIL LlliS 'JU- V1 s_n| aJ __ 
more independent, needed fish, beans, millet, corn and wheat from the North.
Thlus partition meant for South Korea a loss of a major so-rce Of supply for
heavy industrial goods, raw materials and power, as well as of an importart
riar'Ket for some oI its agricultural and manufactured products.
9. Nevertheless, with U.S. assistance, South Korea had made some pro-
gress, towards regaining economic strength, when the Korean War, 1950-l953,
broke o'ut. the war brought widespread destruction to the economny of South.
Korea, especially its industries. And another inflow of refugees probably
more tniian a million, further increased the population pressure. At the end
of the Korean War, the Republic of Korea faced three main problems which
largely explain its economic difficulties today. First, there was the
necessity of reconstructing the vastly devastated economr. Second, because
of its geographic location and the continued threat from the Communist North,
the Republic of Korea was forced to maintain a large military defense estab-
lishment, including a standing army of some 600,000. The tlhird problem was
to reorganize the South Korean economv to make it as far as possible self-
supporting under supply and demand conditions wihich independence from Japan
and partition of the country had changed drastically.
10 Korea. materially impoverished bv the war and seriously short in
administrators, managers and teclmicians, by itself was unable to cope with
these tasks. Foreian aid was necessaryv and its amount and commodity comro-
sition became the critical determinants of both the standard of living and
the grodth of domestic nrodiintion and %nnrnP; Foren assistarnGe as will
be showvn enabled Korea to solve the reconstruction problem by 1957 and pro-
bablv to regain thr nper-cnnitn inncnme lervl nf the nperiod hpfnrp t.hn YnrPn
liar. But the third task - of laying the basis for an economy capable of
grolwth under sunplyr and demand conditions which had drastically changed -
remained largely unresolved. Failure in this respect had serious consequences.
It aggravated the nrnhlhem of nemploymn ment in a countJr 'which had a 2
natural rate of growth of population a year and at 650 people per square mile(in 1960- 2? million lived on. 38,00 square nles of which only 20xC are
arable) the highest population density in the Far East after Japan and Taiwan.
And politically, it nnaced theK ±. t^ w -Meo a very A +ff iicu +'M-t pis-a-rs
North Korea where economic growth appears to have been faster, although re-
liable informrntion is not. obtninnahp-
TTT V7MT i V'PP1 'r'rT1Fr r0DI)MMU
1. The Role of Foreign Aid
11. Beteen 1°53 an.d 1960, the Republc of Korea recei-ved about
$2,100 million of United States aid, excluding military hardware. Practica:Lly
all this aid was in the fo-1 of griants. DJULllng the reconUtruction period,
from 1953 to 1957, annual receipts reached a peak of $383 million in 1957,
and on, the aV-deag supplluleut1u QumwLUtl product by rougnly one-sevenrth
In 1959-1960, foreign assistance declined to an average of -2l235 million, or
about one-te-lth of the domrrestic product. In the reconstruction years, foreign
aid amounted to almost twice the expenditures for defense and related purposes.
But during 1959-1960, foreign assistance exceeded defense outlays by only
about one-third. 1/
12, The very large size of the defense establishment and the high le!vel
of United States assistance for defense and other purposes became, of course,
elements of rnajor significance in Korea's national accounts. Since 1953
Korea's defense expenditure amounted to more than 8% of national product
and total United States aid supplemented GNP by roughly 11%. These ratios
of defense and external assistance are obviously unusually high by comparison
with most uncderdeveloped countries and they influence other magnitudes in
the national accounts, e.g. the rate of national saving, in a way which makes
evaluation difficult by comparison with norms more generally applicable.
Because of this difficulty an analytical fiction is adopted in this report
for purposes of more general comparability in evaluation of Korea's economic
situation that about half of the defense expenditure was a kind of external
service for which a corresponding amount of United States aid was compensation,
It should be stressed that this is entirely an analytical hypothesis and not
in any sense a iudgymept qholit Korea t s vn ,efense canphiliti-es or repirrnments.
In accordance with this hypothetical adjustment, external assistance would
have sunplemented OPN? by abolt 9% instead of the actuln1 12% during the reoCnn
struction period and by around 6% instead of 10% in 1959-1960 (for details
see Anrl-.- A);
13. As -the KXorean Governm.ent un^der Syn.gman Rhee was adanmantly opposed
to an adequate devaluation, a much greater proportion than one-third of total
al wi Tas in fact reqired -to ast Korea -in m-n4,talrnig lt de-e establ.ish-
ment. An overvalued local currency meant - since Korean defense outlays were
fi_ed in +te,ms of Thqnn =-t n - relaivel mo1r+1- e a-i god had to e' ..tllized
for the purpose of generating the counterpart funds to cover defense expendi-
+ Z 1rA Ac T'; c- . Jn ^ 1, 1-ase 4-4 + 1,- A rA 4I;A e 4- P-- ;tetureszf *1 This< Lntvrduced a bias 11V VIIIJ _ v | V11 V | CnL toVVD | A1 s C - u
of "saleable" commrlodities - i.e. raw materials (especially cotton) and semi-
1finish1-e(d as -Te"ll as finshe co-4rgodsan fod -raterthn aptatJ~J.L ~ ±ji±ciiluowilu-LU~ VUUU0 3dIIU 1LUUU - ± duilt.L± U11ul%ICyLui
goods, because it was the only practicable way of generating the required
counterpaArt funds at a time when domlesic savinlg-s were ectremely smlal .
" I * 111 e- 1 G; V UlI1tl1 G |VI WV VI1 ::lElGU|d1 8 1 G| 1dU W 1 a.z444. .LII 1iJ~.± 7 , theU b IcAI Ui ally t>LVtuI i-tve±,- U!L d.LU VVI±II Lid
available for investment was much less than would have been the case if the
Korean Goverrunent could have been persuaded to accept a more reasonable rate
of exchange. Moreover, extremely small domestic savings during the early
years after the Korean War made it necessary to divert a further part oI aid
to importing "saleables" because part of local investment outlays, too, had
to be financed by counterpart funds. And imports of "saleable": goods,
especially agricultural commodities, tended to discourage growth in domestic
production in certain fields.
15. Some of the industrial investments which were financed by foreign
aid turned out in the light of subsequent developments to be of limited use to
the economy. Continued over-valuation of the Korean currency, combined with
1/ Rates of exchange applied for these comparisons are explained in Annex A.
strong internal inflationary pressures, distorted cost-proiit relations.
Lfhus investment fImds were attracted to consumer goods lines which gave tne
appearance of flourishing prospects, but where expansion proved excessive
after monetary stabilization. In addition, a fairly large niurber of in-
dustrial investments lacked economic justification from the beginning because
demand for these products was insufficient or wras already met by supplies
from cheaper sources.
1/
2. National Income
16. During the reconstruction period, 1953-1957, the domestic contri-
bution to econonic progress was small. In fact, domestic savings amounted
to only 3% of GNP. United States aid, however, enabled the country to attain
a fairly high investment rate of about 121' of total available resources, or
14% of ONP. In response, real gross national product grew by about 4.6%
per annum until 1957. Even though population increased raoidly at an annual
rate in excess of 2.5%, economic conditions improved markedly. By 1957,
per capita income had probably reached pre-Korean war levels, and in 1960,
stood at $75-80.
17. This improvement enabled the economv substantially to increase its
own contribution to development after the reconstruction period. During
1958-1960, investment rose above 15% of total available resources, or 17%
of GNP, although economic aid from the United States declined from 9% during
the reconstruction years to 6%. This higher investment ratio was made pcssible
by an increase of domestic savings from 3% to 10% of GNP. Thus, the greater
nobilization of domestic resources for investment more than comnensated for
the decline in foreign economic aid.
18. This remarkable domestic effort, however, was accompanied by a
slowdowm in ONP exoansion at constant priceso After having reached its
peak in 1957 (8.7%), the growth rate fell to 5.2% in 1959, then dropped
sharply to 2.h% in 1960 and pronbably aroumd 1% in 1961 Slower growth
accentuated the problem of unemployment; at the end of 1960 the unemployed
(excluding umderemDloved) wrere estimate dt 1a - millinn or 15% of the laihor
force.
19. Political uncertainties since the last days of the Syngman Rhee
regime in early 1960 undoubtedly exer+ed a depressng effect, Mo,re Jr* tant.
however, were changes in the economic situation itself. For a number of
reascns; to1,al dema.nd decsir-nd_3 -and mn ac;golf cons,wmOer goods ; Iar
ticular which had.been the most dynamic sector, was severely affected. First,
agricultv-al incomes declined as prices for agricultural products fell sulb-
stantially for reasons explained in para. 21. Consequently, demand from this
large sector of the eccnoqvr dropped. Second, the monetary stabilization pro-
gram of 1957 checked the rise in total demand which between 1953 and 1958 had
'- V C -i.LJ 4-f rle' A-L4.P L L' %c4± dli ir, -,he maney)been fe d y 1large goverrnmenldfct and an average expansion n4e ,oL
17 For the calculation of domestic savings ratios in this section, foreign
aid and exchange rates have been adjusted. (/ee para. 12 and Annex A).
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supply of 50% a year. Public dissavings fell and, as prices stopped soar'ng,
private savings tended to rise; the -money supply increased at an annual rate
of merely 5,% between the end of 1958 and May 1961. Thus, inflation no
longer stimulated demand, and, in addition, the rate of consumption fell.
Investments, influenced by the overvaluation of the currency, continued their
upwjard trend for some time. But, rising investments could not outweigh t'he
demand-depressing forces. Fixed capital formation consisted largely of
imported goods; therefore, it created little additional demand in the domestic
economy and had only a small income-generatinp effect in Korea. Apart from
reduced demand, there were other factors which depressed economic activity
and lowered growtzrh rates. Prno(tion was iirectly affected by the stabiliza-
tion program which restricted credit and, through price stability, preventJed
the real burden of d1ebt-. from fanlling as in the past. Widespread illiouidity
and curtailment of production were the results. It must be added that growth
of industrial ourtput during the last fewT years was also slowre do^Tmn hv mis-
directed investments. An unfortunately large number of new industrial es-La-
blishm,ents _ mrncz+.Ar curonstrct ¶ nTi aid finurnd _ wuildl no+. evren inder nor-mql
market conditions, have been able to operate anywhere near their optimum
levels, These rlsdirected ;nrvestments fui.rther illustrate the I a sIt of owI
long-range objectives w'hich hampered economic growth.
3. Primary Industry
20. Primary industry - mainly agriculture and fishing - provides income
for~~ ~ a'ost tw-hld ofL the pop 'toXadcnrbte lgtymr hr
one-third to gross national product. Even though statistics probably under-
stat-e prdcin ecno4 -4 grs in -i inus -per to hav -re-O U.Li yJ ~0.U U.\J4~ U%VUUiJ1LLU [JJL 11 -0 ±Ii jJ! ±L111CU. ±IIUL±Q .Li) CIJ 0~L VuJ 11OVt .
mained below the industry's potential since 1953 and especially in the last
fLe w,Yd 0 .ti iL4 dltu b UVU-UIIL.U. U.L Ul t' affcte toUid oLf the tIiII, ichL coUnsI tutes
an important part of the domestic markcet for other industries, slow growth
ofL thle agr-icu'ltw-aral sectLor created s'Lr-uc'L- a'l im!balances -vJ'1iich- bUecariie part]y-,,
responsible for the decline in overall growth rates.
Agriculture
21. Agricultural production recovered fairly quickly from the setback
which it had s6uffered durJinlg the Korean ifar. Increasing by wver 10%b a year,
it had slightly surpassed the 1949 level by 1954, Since then, slow extension
of the area under cultivation and small improvements in yields kept expansion
of production roughly in line with the growth of population between 1955 and
1958. Considerably smaller increases occurred thereafter. These have pro-
bably been related to some extent at least to the decline in prices with
adverse effects oin agricultural incentives that began in 1958. Declining
agricultural prices and rising non-agricultural prices turned the domestic
ter,ms of trade against agriculture. in 1958-1960, they were 13%o below their
level in 19&5, a normal crop year, and even 26% lower than in 1956-1957, so
that real incomes in agriculture declined considerably. Available evidence
suggests that the price decline was mainly due to the fact that grain imports
were not adequately adjusted to the increase in domestic supplies so that
stocks rose sharply (see Appendix, Table IV), while, at the same time, ptbhLic
funds available for price supporting measures were reduced. Government ex-
penditures on grain purchases for purposes of price stabilization and pro-
curerient for the armed forces were cUt by 0LO. The increase in 0oans on rice
liens made available t,-rough the Korean Agriculture Bank was insufficient to
comnensateR f'or th,i s redunction, so that the free markpt reacted with a nrire
decline.
22. Since 1952, the cultivated area has expanded less than 4%, and it is
cti.l b e hl rowI +.the I il 94Q afcrenan ge. The lt+i ia 7to+. on off larnd how r n,, was iTn ; +.¢ nte ; _
fied to some extent. The practice of double-cropping - summer grains and
riceh = sAp-ea, although IL -i st l confL;ed ut a sma" a rea. Thl crucal
factor, however, was the failure of yields to rise significantly. In rice,
the mriain crop, average yie'sLu j-n the lasutL iuiu.ee year s U U on11_,y .L ILghierU
than ten years ago. The improvement was greater in some other crops, e.g.,
s-w-m'mer grains (9/), other grains (15%) and potatoes (12%), but here too, pro-
gress was limited. Moreover, in some cases, pulses for instance, yields even
declinled. Thus, a-verage amul-ul rice prod-uction in 1958-1960 exceded the
1953-1955 level by only 10%., amounting to roughly 2.4 million metric tons.
The o-utput of other grains r by 0U7b to about 1.5) million tons. The supply
of potatoes and vegetables remained practically constant, while the production
of fruits increased 45%. Declines occurred in the output of pulses (15,) ,
and of cotton (55%).
23. Along with the disincentive effect of the slump in agricultural
prices after 1957, growth in farm production was aiso handicapped by the
limitations of capacity and organization of government services to foster
agricultural expansion. Extension services were inadequately built up - in
1960, one extension officer served on the average 2,300 farm households -
so that potential increases in yields from improved production techniques
and crop diversification which had been developed at the Agricultural Research
institute were not realized. ,Ii'mproved seeds suffered frori mismanagement at
seed farrms as well as in distribution to the farmers and were used on only
35% of the rice land in 1960. Imported fertilizers, mostly aid-financed,
were rmade available in amounts averaging about US$50 million a year, but
inadequate organization of the fertilizer distribution program reduced its
effectiveness. Korea's first uria plant has only recently been completed,
but due to technical and organizational problems it has not yet made a
substantial contribution to the supply of fertilizer. Farm credit was
wholly insufficient and was inaccesible to the majority of farmers who were
forced to borrow from private money lenders at exorbitant interest rates.
Lack of funds kept improved seeds, fertilizer and implements out of reach of
many farmers. Finally, there was misallocation of public investment in
agriculture, mainly in irrigation projects many of which were of questionable
economic justification or were not completed.
24. The military Government has initiated a new development program
for agricul-ture. In contrast to previous years, fertilizer in 1961 was
delivered on time. Under the expanded price stabilization sbheme, the
farmer was guaranteed a higher share in the value of his rice crop. These
neasures, and exceptionally favorable weather conditions, produced a record
rice crop this year which is about 15% above last yearts. The Governent
also worked out plans to refinance usurious debt, one of the obstacles to
expanding agricultural output.
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Fi sheries
25. F-i sh-inp i s a minor industry in the Republic of Korea. contributing
2% of gross national product and 3% of employment. Yet, this contribution
could be substantially greater= Tn 19600 exnorts armounted to n million.US9
or 17% of total exports. Average production in 1958-1960 was 25% higher tl-han
ten years ago, but insufficient credrit kept growth below the potent-i al
Investment remained small and the number of boats was hardly increased after
I 0b. o Mechania on,; essntial for raching the -; irf;.in n pro-/_~+ H- -- ------- 1~ u|vt oz ba sv|1 w 5 to t:) -- _5 I
gressed only slowly. Moreover, antiquated regulations and overtaxing im-
peded developmentA. Uder the new , -; ison for i,rA cre _-
conditions and a number of supplementary measures should result in substantial
prouctionLU ad.I export. Gains.e
4 . Oecondaly- Indust-Ly
26, SeodraXds- man-ufacturin-g, ln n osrcin-cnL-U. eJt n 1ary LLLUU LI± 1IIIiAdU U.U±i I18 ILULI±I% dlliu UuiIo U± Lt- UJLIJ11 ,11
tributed well over 40% to the growth of' Korea's real GNP since 1953. Abouit
18% of total investmenit went into thbis sector and productlon rose on an
average by 12.2% a year. Secondary industry became by far the most dynamic
sector in the economy and enlarged its share in gross national product from
13% to over 20% in 1960. But in spite of increasing investment, growth rates
oI output have deciined considerably since 1957. In 1960, they reached barely
5% and were even lower in 1961. The major determiinant of the changing rat;es
of growth was manufacturing.
I*Ianufacturing
27. AIanufacturing recovered impressively from severe destruction during
the Korean war. By 1960, production was twice that of 1953, and increasingly
sophisticated fields, suclh as transistor radios and telephones, had been
entered; this is evidence of the technlical and managerial abilities of a
hard core of Korean entrepreneurs. However, as reconstruction neared com-
pletion and pent-up demand for certain rnanufactured consumer goods, for
instance, textiles, was being met by rising domestic production, a number of
obstacles tc furtlier growith emerged. Termination of infla-tionary trends after
1958 and restrictions on credit created liquidity problems and revealed the
weak capital structure of many enterprises. Profit margins narrowed as rising
cost of imports inereased cost of production, while prices of finished goods
levelled off. And, as manufacturing industry grew, the neglect of an adequate
expansion of electric power supply became increasingly troublesome, causing
frequent shut-downs. But important as these factors were, the basic diffi-
culties resulted from the effects of distorted cost-profit relations on in-
vestment decisions which created excess capacities in certain fields.
28. Between 1953 and 1960, more than two-thirds of aU investments in
manufacturing went into consumer goods industries where profit prospects were
inflated by the backlog of consumer demand and by mounting consumiption ex-
penditure under the stimulus of monetary expansion. Once the pent-up domestic
demand for consumer goods was satisfied and the monetary situation stabilized,
this structure couild continue to serve aS the basis for f1rther growth only
if demand for consumer goods continued to rise rapidly for other reasons.
Tneperience in market;ngj an umnrealistically lowJ exchange rate, the absence
of trade agreements securing most-favored nation treatment for Korean products,
rnd stra;ned relations ta+ln Japan -reduce c'r-rt nn.o4 i-.4 4 to man,av
importance, even for products which right have been competitive in price.
Tomesti- c markets were, therefore, 4the on1ly outlet4-. MI--LP-u faIng ±1 -du styI' 
itself, due to its heavy dependence on imported rawJ materials (e.g. about
j.Jp0 'o.f pJIUU.U%U Va.JLueL11 Uin - Uthe AUL dJULU.UsyJ, couidU. generate Ve-y ±±LUttl
additional purchasing power in Korea. Thus, adequate expansion of domestic
markets for cons-Luner goods required gro-wth of other sectors, mainly- prirnar-y
industry. But growJth there had slowed down and primary income was curtailed
by the drop in agricultural prices; moreover, illegal sales from the supplies
of U.N. Forces and the Korean Army as well as smuggling from Japan increased
to a point where they seriously narrowed the domestic market for some indus-
tries. The recession in manufacturing became inevitable; expansion of pro-
duction which had averaged 18% betwreen 1953-1957, slowed down to '4h in 19(0,
and extensive under-utilization of capacity developed.
Nining
29. Mlining plays a minor role in the economy if measured by its con-
tribution of 2E to gross national product, but its export earnings are con-
siderable. Output has trebled since 1953; the mining sector, therefore, has
made an increasingly significant contribution to economic progress. Pro-
duction of coal rose from less than a million to 5.11 million tons so that
Korea became a small net exporter of coal, whereas $25 million had to be
spent on coal imports as late as 1956. Exports of iron ore yielded $2.5
million in 1960 as production increased from 19,000 tons in 1953 to
400,000 tons., Tungsten, a major export commodity of Korea, met with increas-
ingly adverse market conditions after the boom ended in 1953 (because of
changes in United States stockpiling policies); but after years of severe
contraction, production in 1960 rose again to about two-thirds of the 1953
level.
5. Tertiary Industry
30. Tertiary industry - electricity, water, transportation, communica-
tiol and other services, including residential building - suffered severe
damage during the Korean war. Reconstruction of these basic facilities
required substantial investments which absorbed a large portion of total
investment in a highly capital-intensive industry. 70% of all investment
between 1953 and 1960 went into this sector - over 172% for residential
buildings alone - yet it contributed less than 30% to the increase in gross
national product. Obviously, the need for making such a large part of total
investment in tertiary industry where the ratio of output to capital is
small, reduced over-all growth rates below the level that would have been
attained in more normal circumstances,
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31. Despite substantial investments in this sector, certain bottlenElckS
developed. One of them is electric power. The loss of supplies from North
Korea in 1948 and destruction during the war had created such a serious
shortage, that even a 130, increase in electric power supply was insufficient
to meet rapidly rising demand, Reconstruction of the railroad was practically
completed in 1958, but further improvement and expansion are necessary for
the efficient handling of a greatly increased volume of traffic. The road
network and port facilities in general are adequate and require relative]~r
little investment.
IV, FINANCIAL SITUATION
1. MonetarJ Stabilization
32. Between 1953 and 1958, inflation was rampant as the money supply
increased arnuallv by almnost "O' 2ni nrices rose corresnondinglv. Deficit
financing on the part of the Government was the main factor. In 1957, a
monet.nry stah1 i znti on ng-r-rn I14nq naTrTprl iunnn wiit.h +Ahp TT.n±Pl mi-tats qnn
inflation came to an end in the following year. The Government ceased tc
incnnr raninlvy mcv nt-ina rdficis ;-n ec9 c:f cfnm+tnn-.rmo4. fr7nd collectiofns so
that expansion of gross credit to the public sector was limited to insignifi-
eant amounts. After 1958J the rate of increase in the money supply decline
abruptly to 8% in 1959, 4% in 1960 and zero in the first four months of 1.961.
A fall in the velocity of circulation occurred at the sa.e time, reinforcing
the anti-inflationary effects of the stabilization measures.
33. The monetary stabilization program was a remarkable success inthat it brou-hgnt abou+ app roximate stabili Aty of- t-h oC 1 prlce levrel.
Not only were public dissavings drastically reduced, but private savings
rose. Thi-s ealdthe econ-l to de~vote - larger ---- of i;ts re-urce-
.5- *.'-e J.±±- ~- UIICM u'. U.C 'a UtCL J.CLL. b~c;L± V 'U .3. .4... 5-f. 4. ---f4 4 --
to investment. It also initiated a process of readjustment in business by
estuabli;shing- f-Linan''-cial oonditions wlich jIIL% requiredLL :: . .LV ILJ ratonlc c managemIrlt IthatIc
had been all but forgotten during the inflation. Bank credit became tighter
andu the reaL cuu o, debt intreased substarlbially. Beca-use of the xiuavy
dependence on borrowed funds - on the average, debt amounts to two-thirds
o-fL assets ini corp1orcatilons - -ieira - liudt -eutd - AIo'reoverv 3-4 - ----- 
the introduction of an auction system for certain foreign exchange categories
in 1958 and successive official deval-uationls in 1960 and early 1961, raiksed
the cost of imports, in particular of rawJ materials and capital goods, from
the unrealistically low rate of Hwan 5 O to 1,300 per dollar. The termina-tiOn
of inflationiary trends, therefore, was an important factor in bringing about
a reduction in the rate of income growth.
34. Since May 1961, the restrictive trend has been reversed. Within
four months, the money supply rose by 25% to almost H-wan 275 billion. Until
then the expansion had been caused predominantly by the increase in foreign
exchange reserves reflecting reduced import demand. But the Government has
also initiated a policy of reflation through stepped-up budgetary expenditures
and expansion of bank credit to the private sector. The expansionary impact
of this policy has assuLmed considerable proportions in the last quarter of
1961 as the Government's rice purchasing program gained monentum. The money
- 1.1 _
suppl wa expcte .- rise to aro --d wn00 billolon _jteed f16
This may well exert an upward pressure on prices, which so far have been
winaDf -~e --e d .On the othuIler hand', ceti stalller exs. Tvide-uize
capacities, especially in manufacturing, and a record crop of rice, as well
as accuulcated foreigin excharnge reserVes carLu aidu uids u doubtedUL lend
considerable responsiveness to the supply of goods. But it is clear that
tihe mrIsiii-vU ±ujecu±on VI 1railny ±IuvlAth econony CwuIou coulut kU i £r iluun ±ge.
wi thout proclucing a serious inflationary threat.
2. Public Finance
35. The success of the monetary stablization program was due mainly
to improved government finances. In fiscal year 1960 1/, revenue was more
than twice that in 1957, while total expenditures were only 22% above the
1957 level. As a result, the current deficit, or public dissavings, which
had run as high as one-third of current expenditures in 1957, all but dis-
appeared. The total deficit (on current and capital account) was halved
and counterpart fund collections were more than sufficient to cover it.
1960 became, therefore, the first year in which government finances exerted
a contractionary influence on the money supply.
GOVMIEFT FTIA1'CES
(in billion Ewan)
1957 1958 1959 1960
Revenue, excl. foreign aid 154.7 193.5 262.2 321.7
Current exPenditures 243.0 278.3 329.1 326.9
Current deficit -88.3 -84.8 -66.9 - 5.2
Capital exp. & advances 107.4 133.8 102.4 101.6
Total deficit -195.7 -218.6 -169.3 -106.8
Foreimn aid 188.3 170.8 129.1± 133.2
1/ The fiscall year coincides with the calendar year.
36. However, this necessitated keening total expenditures. esneciallv
capital outlays and advances to publi.c financial institutions, below the
level reqired for ec.onomin expansion Since ho% of total r expentures
represent irreducible outlays for defense and related purposes, fiscal stability
meant holding the line on non-defense current and development expenditres.
In fact, outlays for non-defense purposes were not permitted to rise at all
hbetwen 18 nrl 10An Some of +he most urgent needs for increased zurrent
expenditures - mainly grants to local governments where outlays on education
uere- ra,ise =- liad +o- be + _met by ctt the share of aia e-end-itures -in
the non-defense budget from 50% to 40%. But, even so, not enough funds
1,- w c. X U VG 1 lJlIJ l IVI11 d4la st' ; .L IILULi Ut I VW
subsistence level and in the past have been a major reason for corruption
among civil servants. And capital expenditures and auvanLces to public fi-
nancial institutions, which were made to bear the main burden. of fiscal
stabilityr, were reduced to a level which seriously jeopardized economic
growth.
37. Revenue, as a result of various tax reforT-s which placed more
emphasis on indirect taxation, rose at a nuch higher rate than GAP. In 196C',
revenue corresponded to 15% of GNP compared to 97J in 1957. -14ore than four-
fifths of this rise was dte to increased tax yields which jum-ped from 8% to
13% of GiTP. Part of the increase in tax revenue was derived fromi an exchange
premium on foreign aid dollars sold a-L auction rates above official parity.
;Jevertheless, domestic tax revenue rose 65,.` between fiscal years 1957 and
1960, or from 8% to Il/o of G>.P.
38. The relative importance of counterpart funds was thus reduced. In
19b0, foreign aid receipts w-jere roughly equivalent to total outlays for de-
fense and related purnoses. In other words, had it not been for the large
defense budget, the Government would have attained a considerable degree of
financial independence. Hence, as long as the heavy defense burden continues,
Korea Will have to depend on substantial amounts of foreign aid. IMoreover,
althougLh increases irn revenue and a further improvement in the balance on
current account are possible, the Governmzent w!ill be in a -position to finance
the investments essential for a reasonable rate of growith only if foreign
assistance beyond the current level is extended. The 1961 budLget is indicat:ive
in this respect. Estimates of current expenditures are 36%, cf capital outlays
and advances even 95'% higher than in 1960, raisi-ng thie total some 50,% over the
1960 level. As a result, the budget envisages a defLicit of close to Hwan 100
billion despite an exnected increase in counterpart fund collections.
3. Credit to the Private Sector
39. 0Fhilpe crrlit ePnansion to tne nunblic sector virtually ceased
in 1957, credit extended to the private sector continued to rise, though
tJe exPansion slowed do1 markedly= retw..een 1953 and 1958- gross privrte
credit had increased at annual rates around 60% on the average; in 1959
and 196O it rose onrly 291. The rate of net credlit enpa-nsion dropped evren
more, from 60% to l9%. This divergenice bet-ween the growth rates of gross
end net credit ref+lected 1n-.ari-y larger -sing s +4 n,n Tlcnrdeposl,t wi
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had hardly rienbenhPtween 1953 and 195- bhi,t 1iin y 1v res Pamnetar
stability prevailed. In the first eight months of 1961, private savings
g-rpew 9n0 mainlyr in respnonse ton hgher virm in+.maximm+.m rnfP.c nnirn'hle orn
savings and time deposits (17/% instead of 10%). The Government, therefore,
has been successf,' l-n attracting nC,-1r. -v n+o +Ihe rhnknnr sy-ste+mr w Thlc r
enabled to finance a large volume of investments from non-inflationary
public financial institutions - the Korean Reconstruction Bank and the iorean
AMgriLL.Lt alt )nkJ -_tLJteVnt:tAI CIJIU aLd ±t reVteCLsL ta UII 78%U wn U Vsolda UU
industry while agriculture received 12% and tertiary industry 10%. In 1960
and 1961, the paterni of lendinlg was slightly changed in favor of agricuLtLural
credits,
41. There has also been a shift in the composition of loans for worXing
capital and for equipment. Between 1957 and 1959, only 3 o% Of new ioans were
made for working capital, and the share of loans outstanding for this purpose
declined from 60% to 50% in the total. This shift apparently had serious
effects on the liquidity position of many creditors. In manufacturing,
numerous new plants could not be brought into full operation and established
enterprises wTere unable to maintain full production for lack of working
capital.
42. The two public financial institutions hold about 70% of all loans
outstanding. In view of their important position, it is unfortunate that
the Korean Reconstruction Banik and, to a lesser extent, the Korean Agri-
cultural Bank had neither the independence from Government and politics, nor
the competent management essential for effective lending operations. The
new Government has granted somewThat more freedom and has initiated reforms
to improve the management, but much remains to be done. Finally, a sound
structure of interest rates for loans is needed. In the past, a rational
appraisal of alternative investment opportunities was rendered all but
impossible because interest rates on funds borrowed from various Government
sources varied widely, to the effect that interest rates on loans ranged
from 3% to 18%.
4. The Balance of Payments
43. Korea's current account balance continues to show a chronic deficit
despite a considerable improvement. In fact, the deficit has been reduced
from its peak of $350 million in 1956-1957 to '-)2L5 million :Ln 1960, and
foreign aid has declined correspondingly. Exports, including sales to U.N.
Forces in Korea. increased 70% during this period. and in 1960 covered 28M
of imports compared with only 14% in 1956-1957. Sales to U.N. Forces, now
equivalent to almost twice the commerc.ial Pynorts;- ontrihil-.Ped mnot to the
improvement. Substantially higher exports of food and cotton fabrics raised
emmlercial exports; the volume of ore exports - mainly tucngsten and iron
also increased, but earnings continued to be affected by low prices. Imports
fall nlmo T20%CZ+. 2 , h.Tejen l[6l97 and 960. TwloIQthn i rds of the w lre+dion z
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due to lower food imports, reflecting improved domestic production after t,he
bad crop of 1956, but food imports in 1960 were still 10% of the total.
Imports of coal declined by 90% from over `20 million also as a result of a
rapid expansion in domestic production. However, all other imports remained
almost stable, and this stability der.onstrates Korea's heavy dependence oni
foreign supplies. Imports of chemicals, chiefly fertilizer, continued at an
annual level of $75 million, or almost one-fourth of total imports. The
decline in manufactured products to $93 million, or nearly 30%7 of the total,
was offset by a corresponding rise in imported raw materials to $70 million.
Balance on Current Account
(in radilion US S)
1956 1958 1960
Hllerchandise exports, f.o.b. 2L4.7 17.3 32.9
Sales to U.N. Forces 2h.l 57.6 62.6
Imnorts. c.i.f. 386.1 377.6 342.6
of which aid imnorts (319.9 (311.0) (2L6.3)
Trade deficit 337.3 302.7 247.1
Wet invsihThp rereipts n 41 17,7 4.
Cuarrent accoant deficint 3X22.02L2.7
44. Between February and August 1961, Korea's foreign assets rose
substantial:Ly and, as pointed out earlier, became the largest expansionary
influence on the money supply. They now amount to 4l143 million. The main
reason for the rise in reserves was a temporary sluggishness in the sale
of foreign exchange from Korean export earnings which are available for
commercial, in contrast to aid imports. Lower sales of foreign exchange
coincided with the latest of three successive devaluations which, since the
beginning of 1960. have raised the official rate per dollar from Hiwan 50()
to 1,300. 'It seems that these devaluations finally eliminated the chron c
over-valuation of the Hfwan and established a realistic rate of exclhange. In
fact, an effective devaluation had taken place for a substantial numhber of
imports as earlv as 1958 when importers had to purchase foreign exchange at
auction rates, By the end of 1960, these had climbed to over Hwan 1,000
ner dollar. The reduced imports in 1961; therefore,. primarily reflect
temporary caution on the part of importers during the period of recessiao.
Sales of aid dollars whicrh had also been mnusually low recentlv have nirked
up. But demand for Korean foreign exchange has not yet risen because the
Government deliberatelyr diverted demand to the use of accum uated aid do:Llars
by lowering down-payments and duties on aid imports. Exports increased and
can be expected non+-ti nue ris;nEnr ne -of the reasons for this epec.t,atcn
is the Government's program for export promotion. Among other measures, this
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includes a premium) graduated from Hwjan 100 to 250 per dollar on a commodity
basis, on new exports, exports to new markets, or increased exports to exist-
ing markets, and exports on a commission basis, or from bonded factories.
V. ECONOM4IC PROSPECTS
45. Over the longer run, the economy offers reasonably good prospects
for growth and less dependence on foreign aid. However, progress will be
slow, and the ultimate goal of a self-supporting economy is clearly not
yet in sight. The new Government, more than its predecessors, stresses the
need for a determined and concerted effort to improve the economic situation;
its economic program is formulated in a five-year development plan for the
period 1962-1966.
1. The Five-Year Economic Plan
46. The plan sets a growth rate for GMP of 7.1% per annum, against
4.5< acllievecd over the past five years. Investment is to expand very rapidly
at over 20% p.a., compared to annually 4% during 1956-1960. Gross fixed
canital formation. now 12/ of GNP. would account for 22? in 1966. Such a
massive increase of investment would necessarily leave limited room for
expnnding publir and npivate onnsrmpti nn (3n3% pa. and p -p.a. respectively)
thus allowing per capita consumption to grow below 2% each year. Of the
total investrPrent vnlume, moPwer, transportation conmmmintA onns and housing
are to absorb 41%; 34% are reserved for mining and manufacturing, and 16%o
for arrl uilre, fishereri and fqrpsta'v= The nrivate sector is t.o iTndeP.rt.c
roughly two-thirds of the projected investments, leaving one-third to the
GCTmroernment and go-vernment-onTred enterprises._ Tota.l imports over the fivev-yer
period would rise to )'2.6 billion; the annual average would be 9520 million,
o A< abovea nrn impo,rts forvv + hast+ *two ras--O T hI, a -. ervisages
export earnings of $1.2 billion, implying an increase of over 300% over the
entire period-!
47. There can be no doubt that thlis devtelopmert prgrr hy far exc-eeds
the potential of the Korean economy. In the first place, the projections of
domresti,c savis are ex-remely am.bitious.* In t pab,lic s-eco,+ +th Goven=
ment would have to turn a current account deficit (Hwan 5 billion in 1960)
into. al OIVVrxlu of no' ro les than Urs-n '10 billo by 1 w~1 1966A tTha.l cuv¶rrer. a,ranA -
tures are 45% abovre the 1960 level. This would imply a marginal rate of
the estimates of available foreign exchange are clearly unrealistic. It is
inconceivab-le twhaatu exports -4il rise as -- I, as -roj4-ed 7)-4 eve lf4he±'..aJ.V~.J..a SL± U ~.I~.FjJ_L US w tV.L J.-. .1.L CL Iia I.U..II MOa F.L. LJj ~ utZ u..; ,t L)U.L  ~Vltl .1.2. Uii;y
did, an increase in foreign assistance, over the period as a wThole, would
sti'' be necessary. Indeed, for al' its aUmbitious targets, the plan wiould
leave Korea with practically the same deficit on current account in 1966 as,
today. (Tn percent of GNP, it woud), oI course, be sma ler).
- 16 -
h8. The plan not only envisages almost no reduction in the economy's
dependence on1 foreign assistance during the period 1962-1966,but there is
also no indication that foreign aid could be substantially reduced after 1966.
This is evidence of the plants deficient pattern of growth. The plan em-
ohasizes; anart from the removal of obvious obstacles to growth, direct and
indirect investment for the development of secondary industry0 But it fails
to nrove conIlusive1v that develorTnnt it the present stage necessitates t;he
perpetuation of foreign assistance at past levels. Suggestions for a
different -pattern of ar'w+Jh su1ffPr from lack of comnrehenqive information on
alternatives. Nevertheless, it does seem that a more thorough and compre-
hensivestUmof Korea's development opporturnities would reveal possibilities
of a better use of internal and external resources.
2. The Potential for Growth in 1962-1966
49, A greater degress of viability could be achieved if a more balanced
oroI.th pa+tern is d-ev-ised and support -A by A d -l-e-. ue omnet a n+.dir n
fiscal tools. Such a pattern would deviate from the one proposed in the
GovernmeIt! Se _ prog m r by pq_; lac- ng 1 1 emphas:is
on investment in manufacturing. It would be directed in particular towards
VILV .JA.L. C ruc.l UL V II± IV ± hi. .JJIU.U~y UI .LVJcL. UI- t OJexp< gthe -frastrcueadtepia dsre n hrb a
the basis for more rapid growth in manufacturing in later years. However,
Uther woU 'd Utll be roomiI fo.r exi-kainSionl lIl m anufcu b-u Ua more careul
selection of projects in the light of domestic raw material supplies, market
possibilities and the availability of managerial and tech-ical capacities
is essential. In the short run, investments designed to remove bottlenec&s
that have developed in the past, must be given high priority. The main
elements of a more balanced development program are sunmmarized in the following
paragraphs. A tentative calculation of its effects on economic grow,,th in-
dicates that most of the basic objectives of the Governmentls development
program can be achieved with a rate of GN-BP growth below the 7.I p.a. postu-
lated in the present plan. A rate of around 5' p.a. would probably be
sufficient. Such a target wyould also be more in line with the absorptive
capacity of the Korean economy. 1/
50. First, t;here is the need for expanding the supply of powJer, The
present supply is inadequate to meet existing demand; as mentioned earlier,
the shortage of electricity has aggravated the decline in industrial output.
Moreover, any future expansion of industrial production presupposes the
availability of additional power. Given the existing shortage and assuming
demand to increase by 14% p.a. as in thie past, the present generating capa-
city of 366 TAW would have to be expanded to about 1,000 W by 1966. Accord-
ing to calculations by the Korean Government, this expansion, including dis-
tribution facilities, would require '$150 million in foreign exchange and
some Hwan 130 billion. The present five-year plan proposes a much larger
pouer expansion program.
51. Agriculture undoubtedly offers fairly extensive opportunities for
raising its contribution to economic development. A program for the develop-
ment of these opportunities and the means for carrying it out need, however,
1/ The Government is aware of the defects of its five-year plan and is now
drafting a revised version. The final form of the new program will not be
known for some time, but it is likely to postulate a GNP expansion in the
neighborhood of 5% p.a.
- 17 -
21 -eater StUrl-r andr cosierti n th.Ithy aper toon" r hanverec 4e *.n th
development plan. Particular emphasis needs to be given to the problem of
marginal farmers. Possible means to this end might include an improveimtent in
;n centi- ves t-hrough arn ex-panlded governXmen 4 purchasn -,-- -with suc-aiustL± L I. 4 L±V UIJJ dIl uIJdI1V u. LUe1 IIU jU i=L~ DlJIir H PLJV lCXI V.3.1. L D L.I.1 ctu.juLid 
ments as may be necessary in agricultural imports to fit domestic market
k | .| <_1- )4 _-I 5. _ _ _ - - A44 _ - 41 P
condti ti Ds Uitd j JIJ_ ll,1IU C44 O-J V 1L4 UWUU Cd UL i U LU pI.U'.L dCIIIL UV t1L±U V% U1[Ul 1dlarriers
from usurious debt and an expansion of extension services to disseminate more
effectivel-y a-vailable knowledge and s-upplies fUr i[Lpr-vtIaentU of teclh-ique&
and yields. Finally, greater consideration should be given to the possibi-
lities for extending the cultivated area tnrougn upland and tidal reclama-tion
beyond the presently planned level. Further consideration of agricultural
development possibilities along these and other lines might well estaOlisi-
a sound case for a somewhat larger outlay on agriculture than presently
pianied. (The present plan for agricultural expenditure is 4`50 million in
foreign exciange and Iwan 470 billion).
52. PAnotlher sector which offers good growth prospects is coal mining;.
Total anthracite production expanded at an annual rate of 33% since 1955
and exports increased from 28,000 metric tons in 1958 to 123,000 metric tons
in 1960. Both domestic and foreign demand are likely to continue expanding
rapidly. The Government's development plan proposes investments of .;h40 million
in foreign exchange and lUwan 80 billion in order to double coal output during
1962-1966. This target appears feasible. Apart from covering the antici-
pated expansion of local coal requirements (related particularly to the pcwer
program), doubling the coal output is estimated to raise export earnings
from $1i million to `3-4 million by 1966.
53. The increase in coal production, hoiwever, depends on the extension
of the railroad network in the coal-producing area of Central Korea and on
the expansion and modernization of the freight-car.fleet. In addition, th.e
present development plan includes further dieselization of the railroad
engines and the acquisition of passenger cars. !Iajor investments in the
railroad, in particular in relation to the coal expansion program, appear
to be of high priority.
54. In manufacturing, opportunities for expanding production of cement,
fertilizer, iron and steel, rayon yarn, machinery, soda ash, together with.
the possibility of establishing a petroleum refinery, indicate that this
section can contribute to growth. And it is likely that a survey of markets
and domestic raw materials will reveal that investments in other fields are
also justified. Korea, moreover, has a hard core of entrepreneurs who are
able to seize these opportunities and to build up a fairly efficient manu-
facturing sector. However. the existing managerial talent, the scope for
sound investment financing and, above all, market conditions impose definite
limitations on the size of desirable investments in manufacturing. The
investment program proposed in the Government's development plan by far
exceeds these limitations, and much of the Dlanned outlayTs - totaling some
$300 million in foreign exchange, and about HEan 480 billion - appears to be
of nupstionable justi P Gati an .
In additin tothesesectrs, invrestmn.Rts in fields such as health,
education, administration, communications, construction, etc. will be
necess'll- l rJrn- ,-.v..---.opp a Cu stant1 inres C) 11uvItlays
in these sectors as a whole and among them there is undoub-tedly scope for
elonr.orl,-I es in aa rev-ision of t1he pIan lo 4Lr ealistic lev,el c 
c.~~~1 The prese-Lt p-lan ca"r for investm,env exlemditmre toaS th^a
3,200 billion. Since the necessary studies for scaling-down the program to
manageable prorpovlui ons have not, yetu b'eenL cor,-.ple::ted). UotlC- 3-riVUOVtl,11Unt U'Llk.-
the revised plan are not known. Preliminary information and tentative cal-
culationls ind.Lica e, howf re-ver, that the progrLa will probab'y have to be cur-
tailed by about one-third in order to bring it into line with the economyss
absorptivie c:apacity.
57. Financing an investment, program oi, say., k-wan e, 400-2, 500 U1LIlOI
writhout inflationary credit creation will not be easy. Assuming a 5% increase
of national income per annum and additional domestic savings equivalent to 
about 20% of incremental incomes, domestic financial resources would amount
to no more than about Mwan 600 billion, or perhaps one-fourth of investment
requirements,. Hence, even if United States assistance could be expected to
continue at the present level (;250 million a year), Korea is likely to
need additional financing from abroad to carry out a development effort of
a size which appears needed and practicable. an the other hand, there is
no prior reason to assume that the amount of foreign aid required by 1966
could not be reduced below the present level.
58. Apart from the availability of local and foreign finance, the
success of the development program will largely depend on available skills
at all levels. In the civil service, competent and efficient officials can
be found in almost all ministries; but their number is small and may
actually be too small to carry out the development task. Less of a problem
is likely to be encountered in the private sector. The calibre and drive of
a fairly lazrge group of private entrepreneurs is impressive, but again, the
supply is not unlimited.
59. The next five years will not bring spectacular growth in Korea.
just as the expansion since the end of the Korean War has not been
spectacular. But it is reasonable to expect some further progress, some
further reduction of the degree of dependence on assistance from abroad amd
some further increase in the standard of living.
ACalc-aaon of Gross Iaaional rroauce and ±uua± Avallable 1Leso ces
-leb in tne following paragrapns, an atte-mpt is made to adjust
official staltistics on gross national product and total available resources.
Tne adjustment is twofold: first, tne overvaluation of the hwan betD-ween
1953 and 196L is eliminated; second, foreign aid is recalculated by exclUdd-
ing purely military assistance. The calculation oI gross nation0al product;
at an estimated realistic exchange rate claims to be no more than an atteript
to indicate the broad changes which a devaluation at the proper time Would
have produced. And the concept of a tnormalt level of defense expenditures
serves only to give quantitative substance to the qualitative argument that
Korea's low domestic savings should be seen in the light of the country's
exceptionally large defense burden.
First Adjustment
2. Korean statistics value all foreign transactions at the officiail
exchange rate. Because the Xorean currency was overvalued between 1953
and 1961 the exports and imports (and, therefore, ConSUlptiOn and investment)
as wiell as net capital inflow were undervalued.
3. For the years 1958-1960, an indication of a more realistic exchange
rate is given by the rates Daid for foreign exchange at official auctions.
For the period 1953-1957, estimates were arrived at by usinlg the wholesale
price index as basis for calculating realistic exchange rates.
4. A comparison of official and adjusted exchange rates reveals
substantial differences:
:L953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Official Rate: 115* 180 300- 500 500 500 500 625-
Adjusted Rate: 210 320 50O 655 760 753 832 1003
Average for the year.
The following table 'Gross National Product and Total Avilable
Resources (I)l is based on these estimated exchange rates.
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Gross National Product and Total Available Resources (I)
(in billion Hwwain, at current market prices and adjULstedt exchange rate)
Average
:1953 1954 1955 :1956 1957 1958, 195C, 196C) 195-1957 195"-1960
ConsUmption 410.1 553.0 962.0 1332.7 1668.7 1711.3 1779.6 2025.1
Invesltmen-t 62.6S 72.7 143.8 75.4 315.0 267.8 3259.6 345 .7
cixed Capita:L Form (31.'7) (69.5) (139.9) (144.9) (232.4) (243.3) (28c.4) (31r; 7)
Incr(ease in Stociks (30.9) (3.2) (3. ) (- 69 .5) (826) (245) (L.2) (30C0)
Total Ewxenditure 472.'7 625.7 1105. 8 1408.1 1983.7 19759.1 2109. 2 2370.8
-ixports 37 28.1 28.5 60.6 43.6 69.2 83.1 109l.8 152.3
1inorts 3,/ 85.1 84.5 201.3 259.8 361.8 315.5 297.'2 384..1
Gross NatiLonaL Product 415.l7 569.7 965.1 1191.9 1691.1 1746.7 1921.8 2139.0
Net Capital Inflow 57.0 56.0 140.o7 216.2 292.6 232.4 187'.4 231.8
Borrowingr froDm A1broad (16.1) (10.,5) (20.7) (-6.3) (0.2) (-30.3) (-15.5) (-6.4)
Fore'L(gn Aid (40.19) (45.15) (120.0) (222.5) (292.4) (262.7) (202.9) (238.2)
Total ,vailabLe Resources472.7 625.7 1105,,8 1408.1 1983.7 1979.1 21059.2 2370.8
0ri°ir1 of Tota-l RDesources (in f)
Gross National FroDdUCt 87.9 91.0 87.2 84.6 85.2 88.2 91.1 90.C2 87.2 90.7
Net Capital I11floW 12.1 9.0 12.8 15.4 14.8 11.8 E8.9 c9.8 12.8 9.3
FporeiLgn Aid (8.7) (7.'3) (10.8) (15.8) (14.7) (13.2) (c. 6) (10.0) (11.5 ) ('9.8)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 loc.0 1oCI.0 10C).0 1(0.0 100.0
Use of Total Resou rces (in ,J)
Consumption 86.(3 88.4 87.0 94.6 84.1 86.4 84.3 85.4 88.2 84.8
Investment 13.2 11.6 13.0 5;4 715q 13.6 15.7 1L.6 11.8 :L5.2
FixeCd Capital Form. (6.7) (11.:L) (12.'7) (10.3) (11.7) (12.2) (13.2) (13.3) (10.5) (1L3.3)
Total~~~~~ 
_0) _. _. 
_ _ _0
Total LOO.o0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10CI.0 100.0 1000 100.0
1/ Based on data given in 'Estimation and 1Inalysis of National 3avin2's in Orea', i.Cnth1Y Statistical Review,
AUg-ust anCd September :L961
2/ Estimate
,/' Compri.ses goods and services.
Second Adijstment
5= ~Koreats PXnpenditl-lres fo-r defense annd related pi-l-p-ses average
more than 8% of GNP. In order to assess the countryts own contribution to
economic development more realistically, defense ernd1tures in excess of
3.5% of GINP were considered as part of the common defense cost of the Free
World which should not be charged to Korea's domestic eAenditures. For
this reason, Koreats defense outlays above 3.5%o of GNP were subtracted from
domestic cons,mI.ption expeniAture and added to export earnings. Foreign aid
was reduced by a corresponding amount. The following table 'Gross National
Product and Total Available Reso-rces (II) ! tau{es these ad;lustments into
account.
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Gross National Product and Total Availa-ble Hiesources (II)
(in billion Hlwan, at current market prices and adjusted exchange rates)
Average
15i52 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1953-1957 -959 196()
ConsuTption 391.9 519.3 926.3 12933.6 1589.3 1620.5 1677.5 1922.8
Investment 62.6 72.7 Th3.8 75.4 3:l5.0 267,8 329.6 345.7
Fixed Capital Form. (31.7 ) (69.5 ) (1 39.9;) (144.9) (232.4) (243.3) (289.4) (315.7)
Increase in stocks 1! (30.9) (3.2) (3.9) (-69.5) ( ) (4.2) (30.0) 2/
Total Expenditure 454.5 592.0 1070.1 1369.(0 1904.3 1888.3 2007.1 2268.5
Exports 2/ 46.3 62.2 96.3 82.7 148.6 173.9 211.9 254.6
Imports 3/ 85.1 84.5 201.3 25;9.8 361.8 315.5 297.2 384.1
Gross National Procluct 415.7 569.7 965.1 1191.9 1691.1 1746.7 1921.8 2139.0
Žlet Capital Inflow :38.8 22.3 1(5.0 177.1 213.2 141.6 85.3 129.5
Borroving from Abroad (16.11) :LO.5) (20.7) (--6.3) (0.2) (-30.3) (-15.5) (-6.4)
Foreign .-id (22.7) 1Ll.8) (84.3) (183.4) (2:13.0) (171.9) (100.8) (135.9)
Total Availablet Resources 454.5 5932.0 10 70.1 1369.0 1904.3 1888.3 2007.1 2268.5
Ori7cin of TIotal Resources _in)
3ross National Product 91.j5 6.2 '30.1 87.0 88.8 92.5 95.7 94.3 9Cr.7 95 .0
Net Carital Inflow 8.5 3.8 9.9 L3.0 1.2 7.5 4.3 5.7 9.3 5.0
Foreign Aid (5.0) (2.0) (7,9) (:L3.4) (11.2) (9.1) (5.0) (6.0) (7 9) (;.5)
Total 1]00. ( 100.0 1(0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Use of Total Resources (in ;)
ConsLumption 96.2 87.7 86.6 94.5 83.5 85.8 83.6 84.8 87.7 84.2
Investment 13.8 L2.3 13.4 5.5 16.5 14.2 16.4 15.2 12.3 15.8
Fixed Capital Form. (7.0) (:L1.7) (13.0) (LO.') (L22) (12.9) (14.4) (13.9) (10.9) (14.2)
Total 1]00.0( 1(0.0 1(0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gross Domestic Savin gs
in of Total Resources 5.3 8.5 3.5 .-7.5 5.3 6.7 12.1 9.5 3.0 10.8
in % of GNP 5.7 8.8 3.9 -8.5 6.o 7.2 12.7 10.1 3.2 11.4
l! - 3i See preceding tsble.
Tab1e I
Industrial Oriri of Gross National Product
(in billion HHwan, constant 1955 market prices)
19'53 1 95jL 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1. Primary In lustry 367, 390,.3 402.0 378.4 411.'5 442.1 448.4 415Agriculture 3,35 1/ 359 :a/ 368.7 3:39.2 36.8 397.1 404.0 411.5
Forestry 19.81/ 19.51/ 21.1 ;23.6 26.8 26.7 256.6 26.6
Fishery 12.5; 11.7 12.2 :15.6 17.9 18.3 17.8 17.8
2. Secondary Industry 1]10.1 127. 14L.4 1152.0 '189.6 206.4 23-3 8 24.0)
iinlin g, Quairrying 7.6 6,.3 7.5 9.9 11.9 13.5 17.1 22.5M'anufacturing 70.9 83,.5 103.5 1,22.9 137.6 148.0 161.5 1683.
ConstrLction 31.6 37,,9 33.4 :29.2 40.1 44;.9 55.2 54.23. Tertiary Indust;ry 373-q 382,1 390.2 .29. 5 421.1 445.4 46-9.3 478.1
Electricity, WTater,, Sanitary Serv. 5.4 6.6 5.9 5.8 6.2 7.9 9.3 8.3
Transp., Storeage, Comiii. 1809 21.8 23.7 31.1 33.1 37.5 42.8 48.21 lholesale &^ Retail Tracde 141.5 145,2 147.4 145.6 154.9 164.5 176.0 179.9
Other 208.0 208.,5 213.2 217.0 226.9 235.5 241.2 241.7
4. Rest of' the World 16.9 13.4._ 1'3.6 12.9 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.3
TOTAL 868.5 9135 950.2 952.8 1,035.3 1,107.0 1,164.8 1,192.3
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1961, Agricultural Yearbook L960, and
information provi ded by Bank of Korea.
Table II
ConpoSition o' ,rosS Fixed C:pital Foruni:ion
(in percentt, on the bssis of cC)nstant 1955 market IpWrices)
1953 195S 1955 1956 1957 19 1959 106
'rirnary Industry 14.9 9.7 10.8 13.88 13.1 10.2 11.0 11.2
jecondary InduStry 16.4 15.2 1-7.0 18. 3 15.9 20.5 21.7 l6 .4
Trertiary Industry 68 2 _ _ _.2.2 674A9 76L30 6 L_ .3
100.0 10(.0C) 1(00.0 1LOO() 10(.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Jross Fixed Capital Form 93.0 116.C) 1(7.2 96.5 13L.9 14-.3 1G9.7 16l.8
Cin bil1lion wan at constant
1955 narket prices)
,bource: Economic Statistics YearboOk 1961
Table III
Production of Nain Agricultural Crops
dn 1,000 MT
195 3 1954 1955 1956 1 95)7 1'958 1959 1960
Rice (Cleuned) 2,048.7' 2 ,174.3 2,248.6 1,8j52.3 2,280.8 2,405.0 2,406.2 2,311.4
Other (Gyi.ns 973.81/l,,209.7 1,28,7.5 1,159.0 1,:324.0 1,426.3 1,380.7 1,370.61/
Pulses - '232.7 188.4 176.6 180.9 :181,7 183.1 165.3 157.3
lotatoes 627.8 770.2 6'36.0 700.4 714.4 689.5 758.4
Vebetables- 5i66.1 844.,7 899.9 704.8 959.3 790.7 723.0 n.a.
Cotton 46.9 47.2 58.6 49.0 25.'7 22.5 24.5 1Q.C
Heinp, iharnie 6.6 7.4 (S.4 7.8 7.1 7.5 7.6 6.5
.ruit 108.4 109,.9 116.9 117.0 127.3 151.7 166.8 n.c..
1/ '42xst,irat;e.
2/' Converted into metric tons fromn b.orean weights
- by roughly estimated conversion factor.
Ljource: EIconomic 3"tatistics Year'book 196L.
Table IV
Supply and Disposition of Grains
~~ ~(in 1,000 ' T)
1955 1956 1957
Other Other Other
Rice Grains Total Rice Grains Total Rice Grains Total
Opening Stocks 2E67 303.2 579.99 111.7 171.6 2B3.3 677 190.3 257.9
Domestic
Production 217h.3 1209.7 3386.0 2218.6 1287.5 3536.1 1852.3 1159o0 3011.3
Imports _- 80.1 80.1 411 425.5 429.6 202.2 683.8 886.0
Total
Availability 246:L.0 1593.0 4054.0 2364.4 1884.6 4249.0 2122.1 2033.1 1155.2
Human
Consumption 22350l 1234.0 3469.1 2174.9 1491.0 3665.9 1915.2 1643.3 3558.5
See_ 319.1 i00.6 139.7 L0.0 90.1 130.4 40.1 101.9 142.0
Other Domestic
IJse 1/ 75-L 86.7 161.8 81L9 112.9 194.8 81.6 111.5 193.1
Exports - 0.1 0.1 --- -- -- -
…lT.in, -Stocks 1…=7 17…1… 2…33 676 19…0 2…579 757 176 261*6
1958 1959 1960
Opening Stocks 85.2 176.4 261.6 61.8 448.7 510.5 151.1 329.5 480.6
Duinestic
Production 2280.8 132410 3604.8 2405.0 1426.3 3831.3 2106.2 1380.7 3786.9
imports 23.2 875.7 898.9 3,8 258. 262.7 - 87.8 11 R7A
Total
AvailabilitY 2389.2 2376.1 ' 76/.3 24170.6 2133.9 1604.5 2557.3 2198.0 4775.3
Human
Consumption 2205.3 1700.8 3906.1 2195.1 1561.1 37596! 2319.7 1789.1 L 108.8
Seeds 40.2 115.3 155.5 40.3 107.4 147.7 32.6 117.9 150 5
Other Domestic
Use 1/ 81.9 111,3 193.2 79.1 128.3 207.4 52.9 111.8 164.7
Exports -- -- - ).U 0.- ) 370 2.7
Closing Stock;s 6 Z 48.7 510.5 151.1 329.5 1507.6 122.1 179.2 3017.
17 Includes waste and loss.
Source: Information provided by the rTin.istry- of Agriculture and Porestry.
TABLE V
Index of Industrial Production
(1956 = 100)
July
1954 1957 1958 1959 1962 1961 ___
1. Mining 43.7 95.4 100.0 139.0 182.6 211.4
Coal 3 =T 977. 100.0 154.9 200.3 223 f7
Metal 77.5 100.3 100.0 98.1 140.5 184.6
2. Manufacturing 55.0 90.3 100.0 111.2 116.9 103.5
Food hI3.o 84.5 100.0 92.5 97.2 124,.1
Beverage 43.7 87.0 100.0 118.9 125.8 127.9
Tohaccn 80_( 5 2 192= inn.0 i0= n101=ii8 I112.4
Textiles 55.5 97.0 100.0 103.7 100.5 79.8
Wood, Crk> 81. 93. 100.0an 1(V nn 1(o n1i 1
Paper, Paper
Products 69.1 87.I4 100.0 134 9 175.8 193.6
Printing, and
P>ublishing 50E6 72.1 100. ) 107. 7 124 5 78 o
Leather, and
Tealler pro', 60.6 IQ2.3 100.A "" '73. *Ig e 4.
Rubber products 76.8 92.2 100.0 155.5 149.6 117.1
Chrzal 53-)7 On, 10. -Iv. 207. r 1~ I 1 i4.4Uliel-IL-Lea' s7*.I ' inr ,-V 0 n, - Lr IIIi I.
Glass products
-1 _- i-- I, L- 'C i a_ nlr. I 7arlQ UrU1iWic. 4.L*4 76IL. iUUwU I U1.7 13.4 90.
Basic metal 37.6 81.8 100.0 135.9 152.2 119.7
Metal products 39.7 iO3.9 100.U 103.0 il:L.3 73.8
Machinery 72.7 95.0 100.0 93.6 69.8 80.4
Elect. Machry 36.1 74.9 100.0 139.4 125.2 166.14
Transp. Equiptt 64.8 127.9 100.0 70.2 87.6 99.6
Miscellaneous 86.4 103.3 100.0 105.8 100.6 113.2
3. Electricity 59.5 87.5 100.0 i11.5 112.3 ii5.5
Total Production 53508 90.7 100.0 14.!7 125.0 ±±o.2
1/ Estimate
Source: Economic Statistics Year Book 1961
Monthly Statistical Review
Table VI
Aialysis of Factors Affecting the ilionev Cupply
i:n biLlion Hwan
End of Year 1953 2.5 9 1956 A957 195 1959 1960 -19)1
(u.31)
-[. Public sector
'L. Government securities in
the banking system 0.6 8.2 19.4 39.3 63.3 57,.1 56.6 55.8 69.8
a. Bank of Korea 0.1 7.1 17.7 36.2 59.3 53.,1 52-9 52.8 65.0
bD. Commercial &nks 0.5 1.1 1.7 3.1 4.0 4.0 3.,7 3.(D 2.8
2. Other credits to the ,:overnment 24.2 60.2 92.6 175.0 242.2 251.8 244.0 o 36.8 228.3
a. Bank of Korea 24.0 59.8 91.8 173.6 240.( 250,,3 242,6 23Ls.S 225.6
lo. Commercial banks 1/ 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.6 1,.5 1.4 2.2 2.7
3. Credits to government financial
institutions - 2.0 4.0 8.0 16.,0 16.0 19.9 19.9
a. Bank of KIorea - - 2.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 16.0 16.4 16. 4
lo. Commercial banks - - - - - - - 3.5 3.5
4. Credits to government-owned
enterprises 2.3 1.4 3.2 5.2 0.,7 1,9 1.4 2.4 -
a. Bank of Korea 1.8 0.5 0.7 - - - -
b. Commercial banks 0.5 0.9 2.5 5.2 0,7 1.9 1.4 2.4L -
5 G:ross credit to the public 27.1 69.8 117.2 223.5 314.2 326.8 328.0 '314.9 316.0
O:ffse;ts:
6. Government cash balance 2/ 12.3 12.6 25.3 67.1 132.3 128.7 128.8 131.6 142.3
7, Cash balance of KAB and KRB 3/ 0.7 1.9 5.2 12.9 16.7 10.7 11,,5 12.5 16.0
8. Counterpart flnd deposits 0.2 16.1 14.2 83.0 114.3 98.9 63.7 86.'3 66.7
9 -. i:Lsce'Llanieous accounts (net) 4/ -2.'7 -0.2 -1.9 -7.3 -1.5 49.6 52.5 84.6 103.8
10. Ne3t credi-t to the public sector 16.6f 39.4 74.4 67.8 52.4 38.9 61.,5 0.1 -12.8
See footnotes on :followin,g page.
Table VI (continued)
Analysis of Factors Affectin the io:ne,y 12Pply
7n b-illion Hwan
End of Year 1953 1954! 195'5 196 1 -95 L95 19_59 19260 Ag 3196Brld of Yecr 
- -- ~~~- (A.ug. 31)
II. Private sector
ll * Loans, discountsE and
overdrafts 15.,5 21,4 35.2 65.6 106.7 154. 8 178.5 237.6 266.6
12. Securities 
- - - 0.2 0.2 2.6 3.3 3.7 4. 0
) 3. Gross credit to the 1. 58 16920 private sector 15.5 21.4 35.2 65.8 106.9 157.4 181.8 241.3 270.6
Offsets:
.4. Time and savings deposits 2.4 3.9 6.9 13.2 13.9 17.9 50.3 53.0 63.9
15. Capital accounts 
- - 0.1 1.0 0.7 9.2 13.1 16.3 18E.7
16. Net miscellaneous accounts of
commercial banks 0.3 -11.1 -1.3 -1.8 4.2 -3.6 -7.4 -13.8 -15 .7
1,7. Net credit to thie private
sector 12.8 18.6 29.5 53.4 88.1 133.9 125.8 185.8 203.7
]8. TOTPL NET DOMESTIC C REDIT 29.,4 58.0 103.9 121.2 140.5 172.8 187.3 185.7 190.9
III. External. sector
19. Gross f oreign exchange
reservec 19.3 1940 47 .4 48.6 57.0 72.4 72.7 100.9 252.3
20. Liabilities 18.,0 17.5 45 .2 34.7 31.0 33.3 35.7 56.6 144.9
.21. Net foreign exchange
reserve's 1.3 1.,5 2.2 13.9 26.0 39.1 37.0 44.3 107.4
22. Deposits of foreign organi-
zations o.,4 1.4 12.6 14.2 21.3 19.3 14.4 lQ.9 24-.4
23.. Net external sector 0..9 0,1 -10.4 -0.3 4.7 19.8 22.6 33.4 83.0
I ONEY SUPPLY 30.3 58..1 93 .5 120.9 145.2 192.6 209.9 219.1 273,.9
See footnotes on following page..
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Footnotes tc) Table TabLe VI'
1/ Includes creclit to local governments,.
2/ Includes local governments deposits.
3/ Iorean Agricuilture Bank and iKorean Reconstruction Bank.
Li/ DOI: Includes counterpart Fund Loan Funds, 3amall Business Loan Funds and profit and loss accounts.
KkB: Includes borrowed money from government and profit and loss accounts.
KRB: Includes only profit and loss accouMts.
Others: Consists mainly of other assets and liabilities of BOL, KAB and KRB which are not separately
classifiLed iLn this table.
Table VII
Price IndiCe 51/
1955 l9j6 1997 19)t5 l95t9 196300 i<y L961 S nptember 1961
1. Wholesale Price Index 100.0 131.6 152.9 143L4: 1472 163.1 198.3 1~Grains 100.0 159.5 183.2 150.0 131.4 157.4 218.1 19,3.5
All com6odities excluding
grains 100.0 122.4 142.9 141.3 152,5 165.0 19-L.6 19'7.4
Producer goods 100.0 138.5 156.3 156.1 174.4 193.0 232.? 244.3
Consumiier goods 100.0 128.8 151.6 138.3 136.2 151.0 184.3 177.1
2 Seoul Consumer Price Index 100.0 122.9 151.3 14 6.7- 152.8 165.5 184.7 186.6
1/ Data for 1955-1960 are annual averages.
Source: Economic Statistics Year Book 1961; Monthly Statistical Review.
Table VIII a
Consolidated Government Revenue and Expenditure
Ludget]/
1097 1958 Q959 1960 I Q6
Revenue
1. Tat Revenp,e 136 0 168.7 2Lh 9 27.5, 5 3
Direct taxes 40.0 42.8 0-9 62.4 54.0
Ind. taxes on dom. 72. 8 1012 1 1
Ind. taxe on foreign
goo-Is -3/ .1 2,. l3. P 8.8q 102.0 8
2. Other Revenue 4/ 18.7 24.8 17.3 146.2 41.5
Tota'l 154.7 193.5 262.22 31@7 8
Current Expenditure
1. Administration 138.5 159.3 183.3 193.6 235.5
of which defense _/ (109.9) (124.2) (137.1) (143.2) (164.0)
justice and police (18.4) (21.8) (27.5) (27.9) (33e5)
2. Social Services 6.7 9.9 9.3 11.7 1h.7
3. Economic Services 21.4 20.2 36.4 140.0 45.
4. Transfer Payments 57.6 72.6 98.6 105.8 150.14
of which grants to
local government (41.0) (51.9) (75.3) (75.3) (80.6)
5. Transfer to Special Acc. 18.8 16.3 1.5 1.8 1.6
Total 243.0 278.3 329.1 326e9 1447.3
Capital Expenditure
1. Administration 3.5 3.2 3.2 6.o 8.S
2. Social Services 7.9 7.6 11.5 14.4 19.5;
3. Economic Services hL.0 52.3 45.4 50.7 71.6
4. Other 0.2 3.1 - 2.3 3.7
Total ;5.6 66.2 60.1 7-73.h 103.7
Loans and Advances 6/ 51.8 67.6 L2.3 28.2 93.1
7
Total Expenditure 350.4 412.1 431.5 428.5 644.1
Source: Bank of Korea
1/ includes firs-t, second and third supplementary budgets.
2/ Includes profits of monopoly enterprises.
3/ Includes collections from premium on foreign exchange sold at auction rates
above official rates, in the following amounts (Hian billion)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
- 14.2 47.2 50.5 _
}X/ Includes neti receipts from government-omned enterprises on special account.3
(railroad, co-iriunications, grain management, office of supply, and postal
life insurance and annuities) and outside the government accounts.
5/ Current and capita:L expenditures.
61 Loans and advances are made to the two public financial institutions, Korean
Reconstruction Bank and Korean lgriculture Bank (now National Agricultural
Cooperatives Federation).
Table VIII b
Financing of Deficit
(in billion Hwan)
Budget
1957 l958 1959 1960 1961
Reveniu 1 J=?7 193. 262A2 321.7 282-8
Current Expenditure 243.0 278.3 329.1 326.9 447.3
rnurrernt TDfici -88.3 -84*8 -66.9 -. C 164.<
Capital Exp. & Advances 107.4 133.8 102.4 101.6 196.8
Total Defici+ --- WE19.7 -218R. -- .3 --106R 6, -Ri -
1. Foreign Aid 188.3 170.F 129.4 136.3 254.7
~~ ~-P ,~s,-~~4- -~.,.,.,4- ~ ~ 1'7A'P -I'00 I. *IT A *2 1 ' PLroceed"s o3f co-jrtery-art 1funds 188.' o -Le.w 7 129. '6_) 24" ,7
Other . _ - 13.0
2. Foreign Borrowing (net) - - _ -3.1 4.4
3. Domestic Borrowing (net) 51e5 12.3 -47.1 55.0 64.2
G A 0ss Borrwig L-, A O 4V oU I.- Ig 200 17 L9 .187;9 f7ev
Repayments 163.5 190.3 165.0 130.9 15.4
Net Borrowing 5165 12.3 -47.1 55*0 614*2
Of which Bank of Korea 939.5) (_2.7)(_748.8)( 49.3) (60.3)
Non-banK puDlic V) (i5.O)( i.7t) 5j (
4. Use of Cash Balances -44o1 X) @ooU -O81"4 )Q ou
Total 195.7 218.6 169.3 106.8 361.3
Sources: Bank of Korea
9/ Proceeds usually differ from the actual use of
counterpart funds. Data refer to proceeds
because they are more comprehensive. Differences
between proceeds and actual use produces changes
in net cash balances of the counterpart funds which
are included in cash balances
2/ Data differ from those in Table VI (Money Supply) because
they refer to accounts for fiscal years which are closed
in February. while monetary data refer to the end of the
calendar year.
Table IX
Private Credit from Banking institutions =1
(in billion. Hwan)
1957 1958 1959 1960 July 1961
Primary Industry 73.2 82.8 88.2 122.7 130.2
Agriculture 6d.7 7d.8 T2.nl 115 3 122.2
Forestry 0.7 o.4 0.5 0.5 o.4
Fisheries 3.8 3.6 5.6 6.9 7.6
Secondary Industry 85e7 13706 181.0 209.1 227.1
NIanufacturing 76.0 117.3 147.4 169.7
HIining, Quarrying 7.4 10.9 14.1 15.8 16.2
Construction 2.3 9.4 19.5 23.6 240
Tertiary Industry 42.5 43.8 5h.7 6P.5 79.2
Electricity, Gas 773 16.9 =1  
Transport, Storage h.6 5*1 8.5 8.5 A-0
Others 21.6 21.8 30.0 43.1 42 .6
TOTAL 201j4 264.2 323.9 400,3 43665
1/ CJorimprises co-,-,ierclal banks, orean Reconstruction Bank, and Korean
Agriculture Bank
Source: Economic Statistics Year Book 1961; l,onthly Statistical R"eview.
Table X
Balance of Payments
(in millionl U,'- $) l
1st half lst half -
Current Account 195, 1954 1955 1956 19517 1958 1959 l'6o 0 1960 1961
Merchandise
Exports f.o.b. 39.7 25.1 18.1 24../ 19.5 17.'3 19.8 32.9 13.0 18.0
sales to ~~~~~2/ h') 4.2 r' Sales to U'.N, Forces- 30.c; 34.1F 43.2 24.-U 63.'3 62e- 25.2 )3;1
Imriports c.i.f. 345.4 243.4 L 341.4i 386.L 442. 377.6 '302.7 342.6 192.5 177.2
Commercial 153.6 93.9 10806 66.2 68,'L 66.65 83.9 96.3 55.7 r7.7
,id 1-91. 8 1239.8 319. 9 37D 311.01 218.8 2146.3 136.8 119.5
Trade 1Balance -275..1 -183.9 -280.L -337.3 -379.1 -302.7 -219.6 -247.1 -154.3 -126.1
Other Current (net)
Transport and insurance -2.:L -0.:3 0.4 -0.1 2.5 1.0 1.5 -0.2 ) )
Investment income 0.5 1.13 1.6 1.17 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.3 ) -.6.1 ) -2.3
Other invisibles -3.;2 -3.9 -2.0 -0.3 -13.3 -12.5 -12.9 -19.3 ) )
Private donations 0.1 12.1 16. 8 22.8 29.1 26.4 17. 2 19.6 _ I3 _ 9
Total -4.7 9.:2 16.3 24.1 20.8 17.7 9.3 4.4 2.2 8.6
Currernt Balance -279.38 -174.7 -:263.3 -313.2 -358.3 -285.0 -210.3 -242,,7 -152.1 -117.5
Capital Account
Private caTital - - - - - - 0.2 3.2 2.2 -3.1
-Lublic grants (net) '194.2 145.9 240.9 31L,.2 380.2 316.3 215.1 243,,L 139.5 142.9
Rebduction in net assets _85.7 28.8 9.1 -6.3 -17.9 -31.8 -4.6 -1.5 :L2.4 -21 .2
Total :279.9 174.'7 250.0 307.9 362.3 284.5 210.7 244.8 1';4.1 118.6
Errors and omissions -0.1 - 13.3 5.3 -4.0 0.5 -0.4 -2.1 -2.0 -1.1
1T I;oiriunary.
e / Comprises receipts from the sale of commoiidities, services and local currency.
Source: rIT and Bank of ['orea.
Table XI
Exterrnal Assets
(ir millhorus U7S)
End of lc93 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Jane 1961
Gross assets of Bank of Koreal/ 108.7 107.8 96.1 98.5 115.6 1TZ.5 147.3 157.0 179.3
Other assets 8.5 3.2 5.6 8.9 10.8 10.9 -3.1 5. 5 5
Total -ross assets 117.2 111.0 101.7 107.4 12 6.4 157.1 160.4 162.4 184.8
Liabilities 2,4.4 47O0 46.8 L46.1 47.0 L46.2 4i4.5 45.0 46.2
of which Japan-Kcrea acc. (2d4.4) (47.0) (46.8) (46.1 ) (46.8) (46.0) (44.2) (44.1) (46.2)
Total net assets 92.8 64.0 54.9 61.3 79.4 l:Ll.2 1:L5.9 1:L7.4 138.6
Change in net assets -85.7 -28.8 -9.1 6.4 18.1 31.8 4.7 1.5 2'1.2
1/ Excludes assets of' overseas branches of the Bank of Korea
2/ Comprises net IMF position, claims on UN Forces, eLnd other assets.
3/ Estimate.
Source: Lconomic Statistics Year Book 1961, 14onthly itatistical Revi-ew, IFS
Table XII a
Composition of Imports -i
(A m4iln US 'I TT
l9 2 7v l9| 19<8 ~2> 1960
F-OO -1 7 Ef 1. 1. n A C17  4. 1t7 6 6 27, I 'A
L I _LV I . V~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ o~
of which Cereals, cereal
prep. Al. .-v 5.1 17. 2orA
Sugar, sugar prep. 11.3 8.4 10.1 7.6 8.8
Bleverage an 'IValak10. e 0 In I '7 If 1. -I
IJsVss 0msLI11 LUUaW..A .IJ. j.> 14' - -
Beverages - - 7W W-1 - _
I obacco 4. 2.1 - - -
Crude Materials 29.2 45.8 58,2 69.1 62.3 68.5
of, whicLhi IvUU, jLJIw-1.U v.u 7.U(.U -lle.l -. ) *
Textile Fibers 28.5 40.4 48.8 413.9 464
MiLneral Fuels, i2bricants 4_3. 4. £14 .6 _37.U o .i _ )U .
of which Bituminous coal W277 20.2 7574 9.0 _07
Animal anud Vegetable Oils 2.7 2_5 2_2 2.7 2.5 2e5
Chemicals 597 _77. 77.1 -67. 687 76.1
o- -which Fertilizer -u. 58'-9 4600 4U*U 4
Manufactured Goods 54.8 70.7 54.5 56.8 38.1 47.0
of which Paper 10.9 9.a 1±.7 7*1 7.7
Tcxtile yarn, fabrics 29.3 16.3 12.7 15.8 18.1
Base metals - 17.1 16.0 18.5 12.1 14.7
'Machinery and Transport
Equipmcnt 57.2 42.8 42.4 36.7 41.8 40.1
of which Non-clectric
machinery 21.6 21.3 18.2 25.5 28.b
Electric machinery 13.3 11.3 10.6 9.4 10.5
Transport equipment 7.9 9.5 7.9 6.9 1.2
I-iscellaneous 7,anufac-
tured Goods 8.3 9.6 9.7 11.6 6.3 6.0
Others 62,,9 U14 39-T 0 __ __ 31.-3
TOTAL 341.4 386.1 Z142.2 378.2 291.7 329,1
1/ Comprises commercial and aid imports. For composition of aid imports see
Table XII b.
Source: Economic Statistics Year Book 1961.
Trhl o YTT hk
0_^6; +tion of ;A T-wortsi/
(in millinn US ;)
A*' Vt:; .S
1953-1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
I. lNon-Project Assistance
1. Agricultural Commodities 55.8 70.7 119.3 89.6 43.8 56.7
food Le-. , ,r - 6L.4 . 1t C 1.6 A )C. I7
Others,mainly cottoin 43.7 31.5 32.9 33.6 32.2 36.0
r ~~, C. -C I nC. 'u I 2. rueis 22.2 231. 24.U '2*4 2.6 AU.)
Pet-roleum, oil 17.7 20.2 20.4 24.7 19.4 22.0
Bituminous coal 4.4 3.0 2.9 10.6 1.0 2.1
Others 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4
3. Raw Yiat., Semifinished Prod. 87.1 iO7.2 0i5.6 2 .U no. 176(.
Fertilizers 58.3 55.7 56.6 47.7 45.6 40.7
Raw rubber 3.3 5.9 3.7 3.8 5.5 4.7
Textile yarns 4.4 21.0 20.3 17.7 13.5 8.1
Chemicals 2.3 3.3 3.9 5.9 5.3 3.3
Pulp. paper 1.0 7.7 5.8 8.4 3.8 4.4
Plastics 0.5 2.2 2.4 3.1 2.0
Others 17.3 11.4 12.9 11.4 13.2 12.1
4. Investment Goods 21.1 17.3 27.1 26.6 22.1 ':6.9
Lumber, logs 6.7 2.5 4.4 4.0 5.1 7.8
Flat glass 0.9 1.7 1.7 0.1 - 0.1
Cement, constr. mat. 3.2 2.3 2.4 1.6 0.3 1.1
Machinery 4.3 3.8 5.8 9.7 9.1 12.3
Iron and steel shapes 2.4 2.8 5.5 4.6 2.8 2.2
Others 3.6 4.2 7.3 6.6 5.4 1.3.4
Total 186.2 218.7 276.0 249.6 176.0 194.6
II. Project Assistance 2/
1. Agriculture, Nat. Res. 3.6 1.8 6.0 4.6 6.9 5.0
2. Industry, Minin4 27.5 26.0 28.9 22.4 12.3 19.3
3. Transportation/ 63.3 42.1 42.1 20.2 10.1 8.9
4. Health, Sanitation 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.8 3.1 3.2
5. Education - 1.0 3.5 3.2 3.7 4.2
6. Public Administration - 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.5
7. Social ItJelfare, Housing 8.9 9.0 6.3 4.9 2.5 4.0
8. General. IMiscellaneous =1.9 -_33 2.8 __3.L - .8 _4a.4
Total 107.6 85.4 92.7 63.9 43.6 50.5
Grand Total 293.8 304.1 368.7 313.5 219.6 2.45.1
Imports under ICA programs and PL 480; includes technical assistance and
administrative expenditures of the aid agency.
2/ Average for 1954-1955.
3/ Includes coal imports for the Korean National Railways.
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook 1961.
Table XIII
Composition of Exports
(in million TJS .
_2g=% '<R 19'7 125 1<f l£
Food 1.1 1.5 3.3 2.5 l5.l 9_7
of wh-ich Fish O.o 2.2- 2.3 1.2 2.7
Beverages and Tobacco _ I n 10 
Crude M'aterials T17 20.5 -1T, 10. T 1. -,7 7 T5.
Ores, metal scrap 11.2 6505 o  7.7
IinLe.ral- lsj 0 - -l s,.-7 l
Anm;.lal and Vegetable Oils - O. - 0.2 0-2
aF -aractued _Goods 0.9 2,1 37X 2 2,1 3.9
of !wfnich Textiles - 1.2 0.9 1. l 4
Others 0.8 0Th. 0.8 oI$ 0.3 0,6
TOTAL 18.0 24.6 22.2 16.5 19.2 31.8
Source: Economic Statistics Year Book 1961.
